FID: Function Modeling-based Data-Independent and Channel-Robust
  Physical-Layer Identification by Zheng, Tianhang et al.
FID: Function Modeling-based Data-Independent
and Channel-Robust Physical-Layer Identification
Tianhang Zheng1, Zhi Sun1, Kui Ren1, 2
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, State University of New York at Buffalo
2 Institute of Cyberspace Research, Zhejiang University
{tzheng4, zhisun, kuiren}@buffalo.edu
Abstract—Trusted identification is critical to secure IoT de-
vices. However, the limited memory and computation power of
low-end IoT devices prevent the direct usage of conventional iden-
tification systems. RF fingerprinting is a promising technique to
identify low-end IoT devices since it only requires the RF signals
that most IoT devices can produce for communication. However,
most existing RF fingerprinting systems are data-dependent
and/or not robust to impacts from wireless channels. To address
the above problems, we propose to exploit the mathematical
expression of the physical-layer process, regarded as a function
F(·), for device identification. F(·) is not directly derivable, so
we further propose a model to learn it and employ this function
model as the device fingerprint in our system, namely FID. Our
proposed function model characterizes the unique physical-layer
process of a device that is independent of the transmitted data,
and hence, our system FID is data-independent and thus resilient
against signal replay attacks. Modeling and further separating
channel effects from the function model makes FID channel-
robust. We evaluate FID on thousands of random signal packets
from 33 different devices in different environments and scenarios,
and the overall identification accuracy is over 99%.
Index Terms—PHY identification, function model
I. INTRODUCTION
Every Internet-of-Things (IoT) device shall have its own
identity to form a trusted ecosystem. Generally, there
are two widely-used identification methods for IoT de-
vices, i.e., cryptography-based and hardware-based methods.
Cryptography-based scheme provides a unique key for each
user or device as the identity. However, all those schemes
require the extra computational resource that low-end IoT
devices don’t have. Hardware-based systems exploit addi-
tional hardware to provide security functionalities including
identification. Hardware like Intel SGX and TrustZone is a
good developing bed for such hardware-based systems [1].
However, for massively deployed low-end IoT devices, ad-
ditional hardware is unaffordable. Even for more expensive
devices such as laptops and smartphones that already have a
cryptography-based or hardware-based identification system,
a low-cost identification system can also support multi-factor
identification in case that the original system is compromised.
Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting is a promising tech-
nique to build low-cost identification systems. RF aims at
identifying a device by its RF signals, because RF signals
reflect the unique hardware imperfections of their source
devices which are introduced in the manufacturing process
[2]. Since almost all IoT devices can produce RF signals for
communication and RF fingerprinting only leverages these
signals, no additional computational resource and hardware
are required by RF fingerprinting systems to be embedded in
IoT devices.
However, most existing RF fingerprinting systems are data-
dependent and/or not robust to spatial variations and wireless
channel effects, mainly including location-based, transient-
based, and preamble-based systems. For location-based sys-
tems, the features they use entirely depend on the device’s
unique location, and hence these systems are sensitive to any
spatial variations. Transient-based and preamble-based sys-
tems are typical data-dependent systems since the features they
use are extracted from fixed segments of the RF signals, i.e.,
transition signal or preamble signal. Using a fixed signal seg-
ment for identification makes this kind of systems vulnerable
to signal replay attacks. An existing partially data-independent
and channel-robust RF fingerprinting system is the modulation
error-based system [3]. However, this system completely relies
on a 5-feature space for classification. Therefore, the number
and types of devices that can be classified by this system are
constrained by this low-dimensional feature space.
To address the above problems, we propose a Function
modeling-based data-Independent and channel-Robust
physical-layer IDenti-fication system, namely FID. We
propose to exploit a mathematical function F(·) that takes
the transmitted data as input and the transmitted RF signal
as the output in FID. F(·) is the mathematical expression
of the physical-layer process from modulation to power
amplification, and hence it can represent all the uniqueness
of the hardware and the signal processing procedures within
a RF transmitter. However, F(·) is not directly derivable.
Hence, we propose an accurate and efficient model, which
utilizes several insights about those physical-layer procedures
and a widely-used function-learning method (i.e., Kernel
Regression) to model F(·) for each authenticated device.
This function model is employed as the device fingerprint
in FID, i.e., we match the received RF signal and the
signal computed/predicted by the function model to identify
a device. Since our proposed function and function model
characterize the inherent properties of the physical-layer
process that remain unchanged regardless of the transmitted
data, FID built on our function model is also data-independent
and thus can be resilient against signal replay attacks. Also,
the spatial variations and multipath channels can be modeled
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Fig. 1: RF fingerprinting (system model)
in our scheme. The impacts of these environmental factors
are approximately separable from our function model.
Using the remaining part of our proposed function model for
identification makes FID robust to the environmental impacts.
Additionally, since F(·) can represent all the uniqueness of
the hardware and the signal processing procedures within
a device’s physical-layer process, all the data-independent
features are derivable from F(·). Therefore, FID is not
constrained by low-dimensional feature spaces, which implies
FID has the potential to identify the devices that can not be
classified by the existing feature-based systems.
Contribution. Our contributions can be summarized as
follows:
1) We summarize the limitations of the existing RF finger-
printing systems and propose to exploit the mathematical
expression of the physical-layer process (i.e., F(·)) in
our RF fingerprinting system to solve those problems.
2) We propose an accurate and efficient function model
to learn F(·) since F(·) is not directly derivable, and
we design a data-independent channel-robust RF finger-
printing system based on our function model, namely
FID.
3) We implement FID and provide an extensive evaluation
to verify the data independency, the outstanding perfor-
mance, and the robustness of FID.
The remainder of the paper expands on the above contri-
butions. We begin with brief introduction of the existing RF
fingerprint schemes and detailed analysis of their limitations
for further explanation of our objectives, followed by the es-
tablishment of our proposed function model and the associated
FID system, and evaluation of FID in different environments
and scenarios.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES
In this section, we first briefly introduce the RF fingerprint-
ing system model. The existing RF fingerprinting schemes
and their limitations are summarized in section II-B and II-C.
To tackle those limitations, we develop a function modeling
method and design FID. Our research objectives are presented
in section II-D.
A. RF Fingerprinting
RF fingerprinting is a technique to identify wireless devices
by their transmitted RF signals. As illustrated in Fig. 1, an RF
fingerprinting system consists of an identifier and massively
deployed wireless devices, which follow certain communica-
tion protocols to generate RF signals for communication. The
identifier, regarded as a central server in Fig. 1, is responsible
for leveraging the received RF signals and certain algorithms
and principles to identify the transmitters of the RF signals.
B. Existing RF Fingerprinting Scheme and System
a) Location-based RF Fingerprinting: Location-based
RF fingerprinting systems are built on features like Radio
Signal Strength (RSS) [4], Channel State Information (CSI)
[5], and Channel Frequency Response (CFR) [6] that contain
the location information of the target devices. Therefore, these
systems aim to take advantage of the devices’ unique locations
for device identification.
b) Transient-based and Preamble-based RF Fingerprint-
ing: Transient-based and preamble-based RF fingerprinting
systems are built on features extracted from the transition
signals and preamble signals [8]–[15]. These systems attempt
to leverage the uniqueness of a certain fixed segment in all the
RF signal packets transmitted by the authenticated devices for
device identification.
c) Modulation Error-based RF Fingerprinting: A par-
tially data-independent and channel-robust RF fingerprinting
system is the modulation error-based system that assigns statis-
tics of the modulation errors as device fingerprint [3], [16].
The main five statistics of modulation errors proposed by [3]
include SYNC correlation, carrier frequency offset, averaged
magnitude error, averaged phase error and I/Q original offset.
Among those five features, carrier frequency offset, SYNC
correlation and I/Q original offset are the three most discrim-
inative features [17], and SYNC correlation is undoubtedly
a data-dependent feature. Therefore, if random RF signals
are used for device classification in this system, the carrier
frequency offset and I/Q original offset will determine the
number and the types of devices that can be classified.
d) RF Power Amplifier Modeling-based Identification: In
the wireless communication system, the RF power amplifier is
a critical hardware component that has been studied for a long
time. In previous works, Volterra series and Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) have been successfully used to model the
behavior of RF power amplifiers [18], [19]. Adam et al. [20]
exploit the Volterra series model to identify different power
amplifiers, and they show that the commercial power amplifier
chips can be easily identified by very short output sequences.
However, to our best knowledge, we are the first to model the
whole wireless device rather than a hardware component for
device identification. To model such a combination of multiple
hardware components, we propose a function model totally
different from the Volterra series model.
e) Deep Learning-based RF Fingerprinting: Recently,
[21] and [22] exploit convolutional neural network (CNN)
and Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) to classify wireless sig-
nals for IoT device identification. [21] demonstrated 92.29%
identification accuracy on seven ZigBee devices, and [22]
achieved over 90% overall accuracy on LoRa low-power
wireless chipsets. They are the first trials to apply Deep
Fig. 2: Modulation error feature-space
Learning to device identification (classification), and future
work might be needed to reduce their computational cost
for further application in reality. Compared with those Deep
Learning-based approaches, our model teases apart linear and
non-linear effects in the wireless signals rather than a blind use
of machine learning. Therefore, our model is more explainable
and efficient.
C. Limitations of Existing Work
a) Data Dependency: Transient-based and preamble-
based RF fingerprinting systems are typical data-dependent
systems, because each time these systems only use the same
signal segment (i.e., the transient signal and/or the preamble
signal) for identification. A significant weakness of data-
dependent RF fingerprinting systems is that they are vulnerable
to signal replay attacks in which the attackers simply record
the RF signals from an authenticated device and replay the
same signal segment to the server to impersonate the authen-
ticated devices.
b) Robustness: Most existing RF fingerprinting sys-
tems are not robust to spatial variations and/or channel ef-
fects. These systems mainly include location-based systems,
transient-based systems, and preamble-based systems. For
location-based systems, what these systems really identify is
the device’s unique location, hence these systems are sensitive
to any spatial variations. For transient-based and preamble-
based systems, the transient-based and preamble-based fea-
tures are always derived by spectral transformations, such as
Fast Fourier Transform or Discrete Wavelet Transform. These
kinds of features are proved to be sensitive to distance and
orientation variations [7], [17].
c) Constrained Feature Space: Most existing RF finger-
printing systems completely rely on certain features and their
performance is constrained by the associated low-dimensional
feature space. For instance, the performance of the modulation
error-based system is mainly determined and thus constrained
by the aforementioned two features, i.e., carrier frequency
offset and I/Q original offset. In order to justify our statement,
we randomly select 10 telosb sensors and plot those two
features computed by the random signal packets collected from
these 10 sensors in Fig. 2. Here we use 10 colors to represent
those 10 sensors. Each point represents those two features
computed by a random signal packet. As shown in Fig. 2,
I/Q original offset is also a data-dependent feature since it
shows a significant difference between different random signal
packets from one device. Therefore, in this case, the carrier
frequency offset is the only determinant, and it is unable for the
modulation error-based system to distinguish between several
sensors only by their carrier frequency offsets. Specifically,
two pairs of sensors are indistinguishable in this five-feature
space (i.e., actually only a single-feature space).
D. Research Objectives
Our core objective is to design an RF fingerprinting system
that can get rid of the above limitations. To this end, we aim to
design a scheme/system that has the following characteristics:
First, our system should be able to identify the IoT devices
by the random RF signal packets collected from those devices,
and hence it can be completely immune to signal replay attacks
with the help of a challenge and response protocol. Second, our
system should also be robust to spatial variations and multipath
channels so that it can be applied in reality. Third, our system
should not be constrained by a certain low-dimensional feature
space, or in another word, our system should have the potential
to identify the IoT devices that are indistinguishable in any
low-dimensional feature space.
III. F ID FUNCTION MODELING FOR FINGERPRINTING
In FID, we propose to exploit a mathematical function
F(·) that takes the transmitted data x as input and outputs
the RF signal y, i.e., y = F(x). As shown in Fig. 3,
F(·) is the mathematical expression of the physical-layer
process from modulation to power amplification. Hence, it
can represent all the impacts of hardware imperfections,
including modulation errors, timing errors, frequency offset
and power perturbation, within the physical-layer process of
a wireless device. Moreover, F(·) is apparently independent
of the transmitted data and the external wireless channels.
Therefore, using the expression/model of F(·) to identify a
wireless device can realize all the aforementioned objectives.
However, to our best knowledge, F(·) is not directly derivable,
and there is also not a well-developed model to learn F(·).
Therefore, in section III-A, we first propose an accurate and
efficient model to learn F(·) and employ this function model
as the device fingerprint in FID. In section III-B, we further
model the spatial variations and multipath and mobile channels
to mitigate the impacts of those environmental factors.
A. Function Modeling of Hardware Imperfections
In our function model, instead of directly modeling F(·),
we choose to model a simpler intermediate function f(·).
The input of this intermediate function is transformed from
the transmitted data into the ideal signal, which is defined
as the baseband signal generated by the input data x and
an imaginary transmitter without hardware imperfection. The
output is still the RF signal y transmitted by the wireless
Fig. 3: The process of how the input data is transformed into
the output RF signal
device. Modeling f(·) is equivalent to modeling F(·), since
the transformation from the transmitted data to the ideal
signal is already defined by the communication protocol., i.e.,
F(·) = f(T (·)), where T (·) is known in advance. Moreover,
it is more convenient to use our insights about the hardware
imperfections if modeling f(·).
a) Definition and Notation: We regard the ideal signal
and output RF signal as x(t) and y(t) respectively. Hence, we
have y(t) = f(x(t)). This f(·) is the continuous form of the
immediate function. We assume that the signals are sampled
at kTs + τ(k = 0, 1, 2...), where Ts is the sampling interval
and τ is the sampling phase. Their nth samples are denoted
by x[n] and y[n]. The relationship between y[n] and x(t)
or x[n]s is defined as the discrete form of the immediate
function.
b) f(·)’s discrete form: Our first insight is that y[n] is
affected not only by x[n], but also by the signal on both sides
of x[n], i.e., y[n] is the function of a segment of the ideal
signal, {x(t)|(n− k)Ts < t < (n+m)Ts} and the sampling
phase, τ . Here we regard {x(t)|(n− k)Ts < t < (n+m)Ts}
as xn(t). Then, the discrete form of f(·) can be expressed as
y[n] = f(xn(t), τ). (1)
As a sample in RF signal, y[n] can be expressed as Aeiθ,
thus we can further express the discrete form of f(·) as
f(xn(t), τ) = A
t(xn(t), τ)e
iwtct+iθ
t(xn(t),τ). (2)
Here At(xn(t), τ) is the magnitude of y[n] and wtct +
θ(x(t), τ) is the phase of y[n]. wtc is the carrier frequency of
the transmitter. Our second insight is that a carrier frequency
offset exists due to the imperfections of the local oscillator.
Hence, f(xn(t), τ) can be rewritten as
f(xn(t), τ) = A
t(xn(t), τ)e
iwct+∆w
tt+iθt(xn(t),τ), (3)
where ∆wt is the offset.
c) Decomposition of f(·): In order to model different
portions of the function f(·) accurately and efficiently, we
decompose the amplitude and the phase into linear parts and
nonlinear parts:
f(xn(t), τ) = A
t
0(1 + pow
t(xn(t), τ))·
eiwc(nTs+τ)+i∆w
t(nTs+τ)+iθ(nTs+τ)+iΘ
t(xn(t),τ),
(4)
where powt(xn(t), τ) is the nonlinear part of the amplitude
and Θt(xn(t), τ) is the nonlinear part of the phase. θ(nTs+τ)
is added in the modulation stage.
d) f(·) in reality: In reality, it is hard to know the exact
output RF signals of a device. Strictly speaking, what we can
collect are only the RF signals received by an RF receiver. To
address this problem, we can refine f(·) as a function whose
input is the ideal signal and output is the received signal.
Similar to Eq. 4, f(·) can be expressed as
f(xn(t), τ) = A
r
0(1 + pow
r(xn(t), τ))·
eiθ0+i(∆w
t−∆wr)(nTs+τ)+iθ(nTs+τ)+iΘr(xn(t),τ).
(5)
In this equation, the extra term eiθ0 is the channel coefficient.
∆wr is the carrier frequency offset of the receiver. The
nonlinear terms powr(xn(t), τ) and Θr(xn(t), τ) are are the
nonlinear parts of the received signal, determined by both the
transmitter and the receiver.
e) Kernel regression: Based on Eq. 5, our problem is re-
duced from modeling a ”black box” to modeling two nonlinear
terms, i.e., powr(xn(t), τ) and Θr(xn(t), τ). This is because
all the other linear terms can be directly computed, which is
clarified in section IV-A. We propose to use Kernel Regression
to learn those two nonlinear terms. In order to implement
Kernel Regression, some representative digital samples in the
signal segment xn(t) are used to replace xn(t) as the input
vector. These samples are [x′[n− k], x′[n− k + 1], ..., x′[n+
m−1], x′[n+m]]T where x′[n] is the digital sample sampled
at nTs in the ideal signal. According to Nyquist Theorem,
once the sampling period Ts is smaller than half of the
symbol period, these digital samples are equivalent to xn(t).
Hence, the input vector can expressed as
[x′[n−k], x′[n−k+1], ..., x′[n+m−1], x′[n+m], τ ]T , (6)
and the target values are those two nonlinear terms. Section
V shows that if our function model is applied, the modeling
accuracy can be very high and the computational cost is also
acceptable for a commodity server.
B. Function Modeling of Environmental Factors
a) Modeling Spatial Variations: Here we model two
main spatial variations, i.e., communication distance and orien-
tation variations. Varying communication distance changes the
amplitude of the received signal, then f(xn(t), τ) will become
f(xn(t), τ) =A
r(d)(1 + powr(xn(t), τ))·
eiθ0+i(∆w
t−∆wr)(nTs+τ)+iθ(nTs+τ)+iΘr(xn(t),τ),
(7)
where Ar is not a constant but a function of communication
distance d. In this case, our function model is still workable
for device identification, since the other linear terms and two
Fig. 4: System Modules
Fig. 5: Preprocessing Submodules
normalized nonlinear terms will not be significantly affected
by d, and those terms can be used for device identification.
Another spatial variation considered here is the communi-
cation orientation variation. Communication orientation refers
the polarization mismatching angle between the transmitter’s
antenna and the receiver’s antenna. The impact of the po-
larization mismatch is equivalent to multiplying the received
RF signal by a projection factor, cosα. α is the mismatching
angle between the transmitter’s and the receiver’s antennas.
The impact of orientation variation is similar to the impact
of varying the communication distance, and hence it can be
addressed in the same way.
b) Modeling Multipath Channel: Multipath channel is
always caused by signal reflection and refraction. If multiple
paths occur in the wireless communication process, then the
received signal can be seen as the summation of RF signals
coming from these paths. A conventional method to model the
multipath channel is channel estimation, where the received
signal Z[n] is expressed as
Z[n] ≈
N∑
i=1
h[i] · f(xn−i(t), τ). (8)
Here h[i] can be approximated by linear regression. After the
channel taps h[i] are computed, we can deconvolve f(xn(t), τ)
out of Z[n] for device identification.
IV. F ID SYSTEM DESIGN
FID is designed based on the function model derived in
section III-A. As shown in Fig. 4, our system consists of 3
modules. The first module (i.e., Preprocessing Module) is used
to extract the linear terms and parameters from the received
signal. The second module (i.e., Function Model Training
Module) is used to train the function model. The last module
(i.e., RF Signal Identification Module) utilizes the results from
the first and second module to identify the received RF signal.
A. Preprocessing Module
For the first module, the input is the received signal and
the outputs include the digital samples of the ideal signal
x′[n], sampling phase τ , channel coefficient eiθ or channel
taps h[n], and carrier frequency offset. This module consists
of 3 submodules as shown in Fig. 5. Power filter is used to find
the start and the end of each signal packet. This submodule
compares the absolute value of every received sample with a
power threshold to localize each signal packet.
The second submodule is used to synchronize the received
packet to compute the carrier frequency offset. We propose
an algorithm, where a modified phase locked loop is used to
realize synchronization. We regard the deconvolved received
samples as z[n] and compute the phase difference between
two adjacent received digital samples ∆θz[n] by
∆θz[n] = ∠(z∗[n]z[n+ 1]). (9)
Based on the eq. 5, ∆θz[n] can also be expressed as
∆θz[n] =(∆w
t −∆wr)Ts + θ((n+ 1)Ts + τ)− θ(nTs + τ)
+ Θr(xn+1(t), τ)−Θr(xn(t), τ),
(10)
where θ((n + 1)Ts + τ) − θ(nTs + τ) is the phase change
between two adjacent ideal digital samples. Since
E(Θr(xn+1(t), τ)−Θr(xn(t), τ)) = 0, (11)
the carrier frequency offset can be computed by
∆wt −∆wr = [E(∠(z∗[n]z[n+ 1])− ∠(x∗[n]x[n+ 1]))]/Ts,
(12)
where ∠(x∗[n]x[n + 1]) = ∠(x′∗[n]x′[n + 1]). The x′[n]s in
the preamble are known in advance and thus used to calculate
the expectation, i.e., E(∠(z∗[n]z[n+ 1])−∠(x∗[n]x[n+ 1]).
Finally, the ideal digital samples following the preamble are
computed. We first compute the ideal phase difference between
the following ideal samples, i.e., θ((n+ 1)Ts)− θ(nTs). Here
θ((n+1)Ts)−θ(nTs) can be determined by its approximation,
i.e., ∠(z∗[n]z[n + 1]) − (∆wt −∆wr)Ts: In the commonly-
used communication protocols, there are 2 ∼ 5 possible values
for θ((n + 1)Ts) − θ(nTs) if the Ts is fixed. For instance,
for the protocols using BPSK (e.g., IEEE802.11), there are
3 possible values, i.e., 0 and ±pi. For the protocols using
QPSK, there 5 possible values, i.e., 0, ±pi2 and ±pi. For the
protocols using OQPSK (e.g., IEEE802.15.4), there are 2
possible values and they are opposite numbers, which depend
on Ts. Hence, given a protocol and Ts, θ((n+1)Ts)−θ(nTs)
is determined as the possible value closest to ∠(z∗[n]z[n +
1])−(∆wt−∆wr)Ts. Besides, in the protocols using OQPSK,
two consecutive samples might be sampled at both sides of a
transition point (i.e., the intersection point of two adjacent
symbol periods) and the distances between them and the
transition point can be very similar. Therefore, the phase
difference between those two consecutive samples is close to
0 (i.e., the middle of the 2 possible values), and then a correct
decision can not be guaranteed. To tackle this problem, we
could double the sampling frequency and make the decision
by the phase difference between the digital samples at nTs+τ
and (n + 2)Ts + τ using the same method. After obtaining
θ((n + 1)Ts) − θ(nTs), the following ideal samples can be
easily computed by ei(
∑i=n
i=p+1 θ(iTs)−θ((i−1)Ts)+θ(p)), where
θ(p) is the phase of the last digital sample in the preamble.
After these operations, we obtain all the linear parts in
the received signal. Some of these linear parts serve as the
Fig. 6: Identification procedures
input for the next two modules. Some unique data-independent
linear parameters (e.g., carrier frequency offset) are used for
device identification. To check the correctness of this module,
we demodulate the transmitted data using this module, and the
bit error is less than 10−5.
B. Function Model Training Module
Since all the linear parts can be directly computed by the
first module, here only the nonlinear terms need to be learnt
to establish the function model, i.e., Eq. 5. A widely-used
function-learning method, i.e., Kernel Regression (KR), is
incorporated to learn those two nonlinear terms in this stage.
To train the KR models, we use the outputs of the first module,
i.e., the ideal digital samples x′[n] and sampling phase τ ,
to construct training vectors (i.e., input vectors). The target
values are those nonlinear terms. Linear Kernel, Polynomial
Kernel, and Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel are tested,
and RBF Kernel model provides the best performance. Aside
from training the KR models, this module also serves as a
database to seal the function model, including the KR models
and those linear parameters.
C. RF Signal Identification Module
This module leverages the first two modules to identify the
received RF signal. Specifically, the identification principles
and procedures are incorporated in this module. In order to
identify the received RF signal, this module matches the
received RF signal with the signal computed/predicted by
the function model. In practice, we only match the carrier
frequency offset and those two nonlinear terms. This is
because all the other linear parts are highly related to the
transmitted data and/or the environment as illustrated in
section III.
We define a metric named matching score (MS) as
MS = 1−
N∑
i=1
(yi,pred−yi,true)2/
N∑
i=1
(yi,true−ytrue)2 (13)
to evaluate the similarity between the real nonlinear terms and
the predicted (computed) nonlinear terms. If yi,pred equals
yi,true, then the MS is 1. If they are totally different, then
the MS can be negative. MS can also interpreted as a metric
to evaluate the accuracy of the predicted nonlinear terms.
The detailed procedures for device identification are shown
in Fig. 6. A challenge and response protocol is applied here:
Every time a device wants to be identified, it first sends a
Fig. 7: Tested devices
request containing its identity (e.g., Device A) to the identifica-
tion server. Next, the server generates a random data sequence
and send it to the device. Then the device needs to modulate
the data and send the data back to the server by RF signals.
After the server receives the RF signal, the first module of FID
is used to extract linear parts and nonlinear terms and try to
match the carrier frequency offset (i.e., ∆wt−∆wr) with the
reference. If ∆wt−∆wr is matched, then FID computes the
nonlinear terms by the pre-trained function model (e.g., model
A) and the MS between the computed nonlinear terms and the
extracted nonlinear terms. Finally, we compare the MS with a
predefined threshold (e.g., 0.9) for identification. If the MS is
higher than this predefined threshold, then the received signal
is identified as coming from the genuine device (e.g., Device
A). Otherwise, the received signal is considered as coming
from an unauthenticated device. This predefined threshold can
be adjusted based on the required accuracy, the communication
environment, and the similarity between devices.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We implemented FID on an Ubuntu16.04.2 PC with an
Intel Core i5-2400 CPU @ 3.10GHz processor, and this PC
is connected to an Ettus USRP transceiver to form an iden-
tification server. FID is tested on multiple types of devices,
including high-end devices like Software Defined Radio (SDR)
transmitters (i.e., Ettus USRP and HACKRF) and low-end
devices like micaz and telosb sensors, as shown in Fig. 7.
Specifically, for the SDR transmitters, the modulation scheme
is Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK), and the RF center
frequency and symbol rate are configured as 2.4Gz and 2M/s
respectively. For low-end Zigbee sensors, the communication
protocol is IEEE802.15.4, where the symbol rate is 1M/s
and the RF center frequency is configured as 2.48Gz. Here the
sampling rate of the receiver (i.e., Ettus USRP transceiver)
connected to the PC is configured as 4M/s. To verify the
data independency of FID, transmitted data is generated by
the software-based random number generators developed in
the Gnuradio (for SDR) and the TinyOS (for Zigbee devices).
The results in section V-A demonstrate that FID can model
those two nonlinear terms with high accuracy and efficiency.
And since all the other linear parts can be directly computed
by the preprocessing module, we can say that our function
model is a high-precision model.
In order to evaluate the identification performance of FID,
4 metrics are applied, including Genuine Acceptance Rate
(GAR), Genuine Rejection Rate (GRR), False Acceptance
Rate (FAR), and False Rejection Rate (FRR). GAR/GRR
refer to the rate at which FID succeed/fail to identify the
genuine device using its function model. FAR/FRR refer to
the rate at which FID accepts/rejects other devices using the
genuine device’s function model. In the experiments, each
time we choose one device as the genuine device and test
the signal packets from it and other devices by this genuine
device’ function model. Then we compute the GAR, GRR,
FAR, and FRR for 33 different devices. We define Balanced
Identification Accuracy (BIA) as
BIA =
GAR+ FRR
GAR+ FAR+GRR+ FRR
(14)
to evaluate the overall performance of FID. The experiment
results show that BIA is 100% in the line-of-sight environ-
ments and over 99% in the multipath environments. We also
show that FID is able to identify the sensor nodes that the
modulation error-based system can not classify.
A. Function Model Evaluation
(a) powr(xn(t), τ) (b) Θr(xn(t), τ)
Fig. 8: Modeling accuracy of those two KR models
a) Function Modeling Accuracy: Since all the linear
parts in the collected RF signals can be simply computed
by the first module of FID, our task is reduced to verifying
the accuracy of those 2 KR models for powr(xn(t), τ) and
Θr(xn(t), τ). Aside from verifying that our model is a high-
precision model, we also want to study the impacts of those
two parameters in the input vector (Eq. 6), i.e., k and m, on the
modeling accuracy. We regard the matching score between
the real and predicted power nonlinear term as MSpow,
and the matching score between the real and predicted
Fig. 9: Testing accuracy and training time
phase nonlinear term as MSΘ. Figure 8a and 8b display the
modeling accuracy by the statistics of the MSpow and MSΘ
of the testing signals. Here all the testing signals are collected
from those 33 devices and tested only by their own function
models. Figure 8a shows that the highest testing MSpow is
nearly 0.99. Considering the existence of the ambient noise,
it is hard to improve this result even with a much more
complicated model. It is also shown that once k ≥ 2 and
m ≥ 1, it is enough for our model to capture most information
in the power nonlinear term. Figure 8b shows that the highest
testing MSΘ is above 0.9 and once k ≥ 6 and m ≥ 2,
our model is able to capture most information in the phase
nonlinear term. In the following experiments, we set k = 8
and m = 4 to train the KR models.
b) Function Modeling Efficiency: During the experi-
ments, we found that the training time of a function model
highly depends on the training data size, i.e., number of digital
samples. Therefore, we tune the training data size and plot
the corresponding testing accuracy and training time in Fig. 9.
When the training data size is larger than 40000, the modeling
accuracy is enough for device identification. The averaged time
for training a function model is less 10 minutes when the
training data size is 40000. Compared with RNN that takes
tens of hours or even more than a day to learn f(·), our
function model is undoubtedly more time-efficient.
B. Data Independency Verification
As stated above, all input data is generated by software-
based random number generators, and the preamble part is
dropped from the received RF signals. Therefore, all the
RF signal packets for training, testing, and identification
are random signal packets. To prove this, we compute the
correlation between the collected signal packets. The average
of the correlation coefficients is 0.18 ∼ 0.19, and variance
is approximately 0.03. For comparison, we also compute the
correlation between the preamble signals, and the average of
the correlation coefficients is 0.98 ∼ 0.99. Besides, we also
randomly select 10 signal packets and 10 preambles collected
from one device and plot the FFT spectrums of these preamble
signals and random signal packets in Fig. 10. We found the
FFT spectrums of the preamble signals are very similar, but the
FFT spectrums of these 10 random signal packets are distinct
despite coming from the same device. These results indicate
that the signal packets we utilize for identification are random
signal packets. Therefore, the attackers can not replay those
packets under the challenge and response protocol introduced
in section IV-C. In another word, even the adversaries can
record the RF signals from authenticated devices with a high-
end RF transceiver, but they can not replay those signals for
identification as long as the ”challenge” changes each time.
(a) preambles (b) random packets
Fig. 10: FFT Spectrums of the 10 preambles and 10 random
packets collected from one device
C. Identification Performance Evaluation
To show the performance of FID, we first try to identify the
RF signals collected in the line-of-sight environments, where
the communication distance and orientation can vary. Here
we use the method introduced in section IV-C to identify
the received RF signals. The thresholds for MSpow and
MSΘ are set as 0.94 ∼ 0.95 and 0.9 respectively based on
the function modeling results. Since all the experiments are
conducted indoor with uncertain ambient noise (e.g., ambient
wifi signals), for every 10 ∼ 20 signal packets from the
genuine device, there might exist one bad packet. To address
this problem, we make the identification decision by testing
two adjacent packets, and if one of them results in MSs higher
than those two thresholds, then the request is accepted.
For all the tested devices, regardless of the communication
distance and orientation, the GAR and FRR can be both
100% and the GRR and FAR can be both 0% by testing
two consecutive packets each time. Moreover, two pairs of
sensors that are indistinguishable by the modulation error-
based system can be recognized by FID accurately. As shown
in Fig. 11, two devices are indeed very similar, since the
MSpows are 0.87 ∼ 0.92 and the MSΘs are 0.86 ∼ 0.89
when testing the RF signals from one device by the other
device’s function model. However, FID can still identify them
accurately, as shown in table I.
D. Robustness Analysis
We mainly consider 2 scenarios: spatial variation scenario
and multipath scenario. In spatial variation scenario, as stated
in section V-C, we conduct experiments in line-of-sight envi-
ronments where the communication distance and orientation
can vary. The experiment results indicate that FID is robust
to these two significant spatial variations.
In the multipath scenario, we arbitrarily place 2 or 3 metal
boxes between the transmitter and the receiver to create
Fig. 11: MSs of two most
similar sensors
Note: MS(i, j) means the MS com-
puted by testing the RF signals from
device No. i by the model No. j
Fig. 12: GARs and FFRs for
5 worst devices in multipath
scenarios after implementing
the workarounds
multipath channels. When testing FID on wireless sensor
nodes working with the IEEE802.15.4 protocol, we found
that FID can still work well even without channel estimation
and deconvolution. The reason is that the symbol rate for
IEEE802.15.4 is only 1M/s, and hence in one symbol
period, the RF signal can travel for 300m. However, in reality,
the distinctions between different paths are approximately tens
of meters. So the RF signal coming from the line-of-sight path
is very similar to the signals from the other paths. Therefore,
the combination of those signals is similar to multiplying the
RF signal from the line-of-sight path by a factor. And since the
nonlinear terms are extracted from normalized RF signals, this
factor does not affect the identification results. However, if we
want to identify wifi signals whose symbol rate is 20M/s in
multipath environments, channel estimation and deconvolution
is an indispensable step, which should be added into the
first module of FID. Besides, considering that the multipath
fading might attenuate the RF signal strength severely, before
identifying the received RF signal, we need to confirm that the
SNR should be at least 10dB and make the decision based on
two adjacent packets as mentioned before. Since the channel
situation is more complicated, the MSpow and MSΘ can not
be that high as in the line-of-sight environments. Therefore,
we need to adjust the predefined thresholds. Specifically, for
MSpow, the threshold is reduced to 0.9, and for MSΘ, the
threshold is reduced to 0.85 for some devices and remains 0.9
for the others based on the previous modeling results. After all
these modifications, the GAR and FRR remain 1.0 for most of
the tested devices except Device No.3, No. 8, No. 16, No. 20,
and No. 23. For these 5 devices, the powr(xn(t), τ) can vary
a lot even in one symbol period, and hence the combination
of the signals from different paths can not be simplified as
the product of the RF signal from the line-of-sight path and
a factor. Therefore, using the aforementioned simplification
assumption will degrade MSpow and thus the GARs for those
5 devices in this case. To alleviate this problem, we implement
two workarounds for those 5 devices: 1. Implement channel
estimation and deconvolution and identify the deconvoluted
z[n]. 2. Identify the RF signal only by carrier frequency offset
and MSΘ. Fig. 12 shows that the GARs for those 5 devices
are improved to over 0.9 so that the overall BIA in multipath
TABLE I: Comparison between FID and modulation error-based system (in line-of-sight environments)
F ID Modulation error-based System
overall performance two most similar devices overall performance two most similar devices
GAR, GFR 0.97, 0.03 1.0, 0.0 0.94, 0.06 1.0, 0.0 0.91, 0.09 0.58, 0.42
FAR, FFR 0.0, 1.0 0.0, 1.0 0.0, 1.0 0.0, 1.0 0.12, 0.88 0.44, 0.56
BIA 0.99 1.0 0.97 1.0 0.90 0.57
environments is over 99%.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
RF fingerprinting is a cost-efficient identification method
for low-end IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a func-
tion model, which is a high-precision approximation of the
mathematical expression of the physical-layer process from
modulation to power amplification, as RF fingerprint for de-
vice identification. A data-independent and channel-robust RF
fingerprinting system is further designed based on our function
model, namely FID. FID is evaluted in various scenarios, and
it achieves over 99% accuracy overall.
FID is a successful trial to break the convention of design-
ing a feature-based RF fingerprinting system. Our basic idea is
straightforward since similar approaches have been used for
identifying power amplifiers [20]. However, we are the first
to demonstrate that such kind of methods can work on real
devices, and our function model is also a novel accurate and
efficient model. These are our two main technical contributions
in this paper. However, there are several open issues related
to FID that require further study. For instance, FID will
bring a new challenge for the security research in this area,
because FID can reproduce almost the same RF signals as
the authenticated devices produce. Specifically, by using FID,
the attackers can simply compute the transmitted signal by the
references of the linear parts and the nonlinear terms by the
pre-trained KR models. If the attackers use a high-end RF
transceiver, the reproduced signals will be very similar to the
genuine signals. Therefore, our function modeling method can
be applied to attack most existing RF fingerprinting systems,
and it is challenging to defend this attack.
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